



Nikola Tohma

**Parakratos:
Narratives of Political
and Military Conspiracies
in Modern Greek
Historiography**

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Nikola Tohma

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Abbreviations

ACC	Allied Clandestine Committee
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
AMFOGE	American Mission to Observe Greek Elections
ANEL	Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines)
ASE	Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (Antikommounistiki Stavroforia Ellados)
ASO	Antifascist Military Organization (Antifasistiki Stratiotiki Organosi)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPC	Clandestine Planning Committee
DNL	Lambrakis Democratic Youth (Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki)
DSE	Democratic Army of Greece (Dimokratikos Stratos tis Ellados)
EAM/ELAS	National Liberation Front/Greek People's Liberation Army (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo/Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos)
EAO	National Anti-communist Organization of Katerini, Pieria and Olympos (Ethniki Antikommounistiki Organosis Katerinis, Pierion kai Olympou)
EAT-ESA	Special Investigation Department of the Greek Military Police (Eidiko Anakritiko Tmima tis Ellinikis Stratiotikis Astynomias)
EDA	United Democratic Left (Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera)

EDES	National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos)
EEC	European Economic Community
EEDYE	Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace (Elliniki Epitropi dia tin Diethni Yfesi kai Eirini)
EEE	Union of Nationally Minded ELAS Fighters (Enosis Ethnikofronon Elasion)
EEE	National Union of Greece (Ethniki Enosis Ellas)
EENA	Union of Young Greek Officers (Ethniki Enosis Neon Axiomatikon)
EES	National Greek Army (a paramilitary organization; Ethnikos Ellinikos Stratos)
EFEE	National Student Union of Greece (Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Ellados)
EK	Center Union (Enosis Kendrou)
EKA	National Social Change (Ethniki Koinoniki Allagi)
EKD	National Social Action (Ethniki Koinoniki Drasis)
EKE	National Social Assault (Ethniki Koinoniki Exormisis)
EKKA	National and Social Liberation (Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis)
EKOF	National Social Organization of Students (Ethniki Koinoniki Organosi Foititon)
ENA	Union of Young Officers (Enosis Neon Axiomatikon)
EON	National Youth Organization (Ethniki Organosis Neolaias)
EPON	United Panhellenic Organization of Youth (Eniaia Panelladiki Organosi Neon)
ERE	National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis)
EREN	National Radical Union's Youth (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi Neon)
ERP	European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)
ES	Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos)
EVON	National Royalist Youth Organization (Ethniki Vasiliki Organosi Neolaias)
FIDE	Liberal Democratic Union (Fileleftheri Dimokratiki Enosi)
FPEP	Piraeus Spiritual Home for Students (Foititiki Pnevmatiki Estia Peiraios)
GDEA	General Directorate of National Security (Geniki Diefthynsi Ethnikis Asfaleias)
GDTP	General Directorate of Press and Information (Geniki Diefthynsis Typou kai Pliroforion)

GEA	General Staff of the Air Force (Geniko epiteleio aeroporias)
GEETHA	Hellenic National Defense General Staff (Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Amynas)
GES	Hellenic Army General Staff (Geniko Epiteleio Stratou)
GSEE	General Confederation of Greek Workers (Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados)
IDEA	Holy Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon)
JUSMAPG	Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group
K4A	August 4 Party (Komma 4is Avgoustou)
KKE	Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma tis Ellados)
KKE/ETKD	Communist Party of Greece/Greek Section of the Communist International (Kommounistiko Komma Ellados/Elliniko Tmima tis Kommounistikis Diethnous)
KYP	Central Intelligence Service (Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion)
LOK	Mountain Raider Companies (Lochoi Oreinon Katastromon)
MAD	Municipal Security Units (Monades Asfaleias Dimosyndiritoi)
MAH	Organization for National Security Affairs (Milli Amele Hizmet)
MAY	Country Security Units (Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou)
MEA	Units of National Defense (Monades Ethnofylakis Amynis)
MIT	National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbaarat Teskilati)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia)
NDS	Nuclei for Defense of the State (Nuclei di Difesa della Stato)
NED	Youth of National Action (Neolaia Ethnikis Draseos)
NEDA	EDA Youth (Neolaia tis EDA)
NOA	Nazi Organization of Athens (Nazistiki Organosi Athinon)
OAAEE	Organization of Unseen Fighters of the Greek Nation (Organosis Aoraton Agoniston Ellinikou Ethnous)
OEA	Association for the National Renaissance (Omilos Ethnikis Anagenniseos)

OEА	Organization of National Resistance (Organosis Ethnikis Antistaseos)
OEFI	Organization of Nationally Minded Medical Students (Organosi Ethnikofronon Foititon Iatrikis)
OEN-SEN	Organization of National Youth – Corps of Hopeful Youth (Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias – Soma Elpidoforon Neon)
OHD	Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi)
ONEK	Center Union’s Youth Organization (Organosi Neon Enoseos Kendrou)
OSEN	Student Organization of National Youth (Organosi Spoudaston Ethnikis Neolaias)
PAME	All-Democratic Greek Agricultural Front (Pandimokratiko Agrotiko Metopo Ellados)
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima)
PEEA	Political Committee of National Liberation (Politiki Epi-tropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis)
PEKEN	Panhellenic National Social Union of Youth (Panellinia Ethniki Koinoniki Enosi Neon)
PEN	Progressive Union of Youth (Proodeftiki Enosi Neon)
PES	Panhellenic National Crusade (Panellinios Ethniki Stavroforia)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)
PSE	Panhellenic Association of Reservists (Panellinios Syndes-mos Efedron)
SAN	Association of Young Officers (Syndesmos Aksiomatikon Neon)
SEA	Corps of Valiant Greeks (Soma Ellinon Alkimon)
SEKE	Socialist Labor Party of Greece (Sosialistiko Ergatiko Komma Ellados)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SID	Defense Information Service (Servizio Informazioni Difesa)
SIFAR	Armed Forces Information Service (Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate)
SIS (MI6)	Secret Intelligence Service
SISMI	Military Intelligence and Security Service (Servizio Infor-mazioni Sicurezza Militare)
SOE	Special Operations Executive

SPEAN	Association for the Spiritual and Cultural Development of the Youth of Vyronas (Syllogos Pnevmatikis kai Ekpolitistikis Anaptyxeos Neon Vyronos)
STK	Tactical Mobilization Group (Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu)
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras)
TEA	Battalions of National Defense (Tagmata Ethnofylakis Amynis)
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US	United States of America
USIA/USIS	United States Information Agency/United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VESMA	Royal Hellenic Army of the Middle East (Vasilikos Ellinikos Stratos Mesis Anatolis)
XA	Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi)

Introduction

When we study political developments in post-civil war Greece (1949–1967), we frequently encounter the term *parakratos* in the works of historians, political scientists, sociologists, and political analysts whether they are from Greece or another country. The *parakratos* can also be referred to as the *parastate* or *deep state*, but it can most simply be defined as a parallel system of political power. Most authors mention it only briefly, and do not provide a detailed explanation of its origins, its component parts, how it functioned, or what it represented. Scholars who do analyze the *parakratos* more thoroughly often take entirely different approaches to it, which has caused great confusion about the nature of the *parakratos* and the many ways it manifested itself in the domestic political reality of Greece. Because of the lack of comprehensive research, the literature is full of mutually conflicting interpretations of the *parakratos*. Scholars place its origins and its operation in various historical periods and in diverse geographical areas, social environments, and institutional settings. There is no consensus about which actors constituted the *parakratos*, nor is there any certainty about their aims. The *parakratos* is ill-defined, and its meaning has been stretched in both academic and popular literature to cover a large array of very heterogeneous historical and political phenomena.

The term *parakratos* implies a hidden power mechanism of a political, military, and paramilitary character, which presumably operates behind the scenes and aims to direct political developments.¹ While the histo-

1 Georgios Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas* [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language] (Athens: Kentro lexikologias, 2002), 1328.

riographical focus lies on post-civil war Greece, some authors trace its origins back to the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).² Others see it continuing to exist in Greece well after 1974, when the country began to democratize after the fall of the junta, and still today.³ The literature on the post-civil war *parakratos* mostly discusses rural and urban paramilitaries and conspiratorial groupings within the national military. The paramilitaries committed various forms of political violence such as murders, physical attacks, and intimidation of political opponents, and combined them with propaganda and illegal economic activity. Military conspiracies stemmed from the politicization and fractionalization of the Greek army and manifested themselves in interference by army officers in political affairs, coups, and military dictatorship. The historiography of Greece tends to portray the post-civil war *parakratos* as a large-scale conspiracy, which involved powerful political, military, security, economic, and legal actors who all plotted together against their political adversaries. Used that way, the term *parakratos* explains certain historic political events in a conspiratorial manner and bolsters the ideological prejudices of the scholars who study them.

The conspiratorial image of the *parakratos* has reflected the atmosphere of Greece during the Cold War. Following the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), and with the encouragement of the United States,⁴ Greece turned itself into a bulwark of anti-communism, preoccupied with a combined external and internal communist threat that was presumably striving to subvert its political and social order. Greece entered NATO together with Turkey in 1952. Its membership was meant to resist the “red peril” from the north, at a time when its neighboring countries had

- 2 Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits’: Nation-Building, Patronage and the Making of the Greek Deep State,” *Balkanistica* 30, no. 1 (2017): 37–64.
- 3 Dimitris Psarras, “O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou. Apo ton Maniadaki ston Michaloliako. [Konstantinos Plevris and the August 4 Party. From Maniadakis Until Michaloliakos],” *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 47–68; Tasos Kostopoulos, “O nazismos os egeheirima antiexegesis: To ‘vathy kratos’ kai i anodos tis Chrysis Avgis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture: The ‘Deep State’ and the Rise of the Golden Dawn],” *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 69–88; Dimitris Christopoulos, ed., *To “vathy kratos” sti simerini Ellada kai i Akrodexia: Astynomia, dikaiosyni, stratos, ekklesia [The “Deep State” in Today’s Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church]* (Athens: Nisos, 2014).
- 4 Lars Bærentzen and John O. Iatrides, *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945–1949* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987); David H. Close, ed., *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); André Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War: Greece 1943–1949* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2016).

recently turned communist.⁵ The Greek government persecuted the left-wing sympathizers who had been defeated in the civil war and excluded them from politics thereafter. It regarded them as a “fifth column” that was acting in the interest of the USSR against the Greek nation.⁶

The *parakratos* arose in a deeply divided society suffering from profound political polarization, which had existed long before the civil war. The National Schism (*Ethnikos Dichasmos*, 1915–1917), was essentially another civil war, fought over Greece’s participation in the First World War, that escalated the disputes between republicans and monarchists.⁷ Ongoing political instability throughout the interwar period led to the imposition of an ultra-conservative, monarchist dictatorship under Ioannis Metaxas (1936–1941).⁸ The third party in this internal political conflict—the communists—emerged as a significant power only after their successful left-wing resistance against the Axis occupation (1941–1944).⁹

In post-civil war Greece, the domestic political scene featured three main blocs, each of which championed their own distorted and mutually conflicting histories of the Second World War, the civil war, and the post-civil war period.¹⁰ They were the victorious political “Right,” the

5 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006); Dimitrios A. Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949–1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949–1967)*] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2014).

6 Andreas Stergiou, “Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece],” in *Jahrbuch Für Historische Kommunismusforschung* [Yearbook for the Historical Research of Communism] (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2011), 101–18; Stratis Bournazos, “To kratos ton ethnikoforonon: antikommounistikos logos kai praktikes [The State of Nationally Minded: Anti-Communist Speech and Practice],” *Archeiologia* 16 (November 2014): 9–49.

7 George Th. Mavrogordatos, 1915: *O ethnikos dichasmos* [1915: *The National Schism*] (Athens: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2016); Thanasis Diamantopoulos, *I dekaetia tou 1910. Ethnikos Dichasmos (To teuchos)* [*The Decade of 1910. National Schism (1st volume)*], 10 kai mia dekaetias politikon diaireseon: Oi diairetikes tomes stin Ellada tin periodo 1910–2017 [Ten Plus One Decades of Political Divisions: The Dividing Sections in Greece Between 1910–2017] (Athens: Epikentro, 2017); Georgios Dertilis, *Epta polemoi, tesseri emfylioi, epta ptocheis, 1821–2016* [Seven Wars, Four Civil Wars, and Seven Bankruptcies, 1821–2016] (Athens: Polis, 2016), 71–86.

8 For example, S. Victor Papacosma, “Ioannis Metaxas and the ‘Fourth of August’ Dictatorship in Greece,” in *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe*, ed. Bernd Jürgen Fischer (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), 165–98.

9 See Richard Clogg, *Greece, 1940–1949. Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: A Documentary History* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, *A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People’s Armies*, Cultural History of Modern War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

10 Cf. Eleni Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos: I dekaetia tou 1940 ston politiko logo, 1950–1967* [*A War Without an End: The Decade of the 1940s in the Political Speech, 1950–1967*] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010).

defeated “Left,” and the disunited “Center.”¹¹ Each of them used their historical narratives as tools for mobilizing their voters. The blocs roughly correspond to the strongest parties of the Greek political spectrum of the time: the right-wing Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos, ES) – later replaced by the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, ERE); the United Democratic Left (Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, EDA); and the Center Union (Enosis Kendrou, EK). The EK was established only in the early 1960s, on the ruins of several feeble centrist political parties. I decided to use these Left–Right distinctions because they are typically characterized as such in post-civil war political speech and in the historiography of the post-civil war period. They are also useful in analyzing the *parakratos* as it appears in the anti-Right discourse of the Left and the Center.

The strongly ideological discourse of the civil war and the post-civil war period persisted in Greek society in the period of democratization after 1974. It influenced the manner in which historians and political analysts approached these political developments. The fall of the junta became a milestone, after which long-suppressed left-wing narratives began to prevail over conservative right-wing discourse. In Greece and abroad, scholars have recently produced a number of outstanding analyzes of the civil war. Offering a revised and more balanced interpretation of history, they contest the predominantly left-leaning historiography of the previous decades and seek to heal the longstanding rift in Greek society.¹² Despite their efforts, stereotypes on the role of the three blocs—the

11 For details, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, “Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolutions, Current Trends,” in *Greece in the 1980s*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan Press, n.d.), 52; David H. Close, *Greece since 1945* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2002), 100–103; Takis S. Pappas, “Depolarization, Cleavage Liquidation, and Two-Partyism: The Declining Role of Ideology in Postwar Greek Politics” (Cleavage Development: Causes and Consequences, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, 2003), 1–37; Giannis Voulgaris, *I metapoliteftiki Ellada, 1974–2009* [*Greece after the Regime Change, 1974–2009*] (Athens: Polis, 2013), 34–36.

12 See especially Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Nikos Marantzidis, *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE): 1946–1949* [*The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE): 1946–1949*], Themata Istorias 2 (Athens: Ekdosis Alexandria, 2010); Nikos Demertzis, Eleni Paschaloudi, and Giorgos Antoniou, eds., *Emfylios: Politistiko trauma* [*The Civil War: Cultural Trauma*] (Athens: Alexandria, 2013). For a commentary, see Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou, “The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941–2002,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 2 (2004): 223–31; Dimitris Paivanas, “Un-Framing the Greek Civil War,” *Modern Greek Studies* 18 (2017): 107–22; Spyridon Plakoudas, *The Greek Civil War: Strategy, Counterinsurgency and the Monarchy*, International Library of War Studies 21 (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 2–5; John Sakkas, “Old Interpretations and New Approaches in the Historiography of the Greek Civil War,” *Thetis*, no. 20 (2013): 425–39.

Right, the Left, and the Center—in the civil war and post-civil war events linger on in the public debate. They are drawn from earlier academic works and political statements that were based on biased presumptions. There is, on the one hand, a tendency to idealize the left-wing Second World War resistance and the communist struggle in the civil war, while downplaying the social and political threat posed by communism. On the other hand, the conservative approach supports an uncritical assessment of the post-civil war anti-communist governments and even justifies undemocratic measures by referring to the communist danger. Finally, many Greeks of whatever political leanings excuse the deficiencies of the political actors of the time by referring to conspiracies. Political responsibility is thus often minimized in the public debate by playing up the infamous “foreign factor” (*xenos paragontas*).¹³ This term signified the continuous involvement of the Great Powers in Greece’s domestic affairs ever since the modern Greek state emerged in the 1820s. The “foreign factor” forms part of broader discourses of “crypto-colonialism,” as formulated by Michael Herzfeld, according to which Greece as a country was not directly colonized in its past but experienced a long-term dependence on colonial powers that prevented it from obtaining full sovereignty and recognition.¹⁴ In Cold War Greece this role was attributed to the United States. According to many, the United States was behind most of the conspiratorial events of the civil war and the post-civil war period.¹⁵

The political leanings of researchers of the history of civil war and post-civil war Greece inevitably impacted their writings on the *parakratos*. The term is mostly used in left-wing and centrist discourses and is practically absent from right-wing discourse. This fact motivated me to study the phenomenon from a broader perspective, with the understanding that it relates not only to the historical events and actors that are usually

13 Heinz Richter, “Zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Die politische Kultur Griechenlands [Between Tradition and Modernity: Political Culture in Greece],” in *Politische Kultur in Westeuropa* [Political Culture in Western Europe], ed. Peter Reichel (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1984), 148; Pavlos Tzermias, *Politik in neuen Hellas: Strukturen, Theorien und Parteien im Wandel* [Politics in New Hellas: Structures, Theories and Parties in Transition] (Tübingen: Francke, 1997), 13; Kateřina Králová, “Between Tradition and Modernity: Greek-German Relations in Retrospect,” *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialis* 4 (2009): 101.

14 Michael Herzfeld, “The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002): 899–926.

15 For a discussion, see for example John L. Hondros, “Greece and the German Occupation,” in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 32; Nikos Alivizatos, “The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944–1949,” in *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy*, ed. John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 166–67.

discussed. First of all, I decided to investigate the use of the term *parakratos* as a social scientific concept and embed it in the larger international academic debate about similar phenomena in other countries. Secondly, using the cases of Italy and Turkey, I framed the *parakratos* within the wider context of the Cold War, abandoning a purely Greek focus. Thirdly, I explored the *parakratos* as a politically biased term and interpreted it with a focus on the dominant discourse of the post-civil war period. Finally, I analyzed the diverse interpretations of the term that I found in the historiography of Greece. By doing so, I gained further insight into the practical uses of the term, its symbolic meaning, and the effect the term has had on assessments of the post-civil war era. In this way, I could better understand the multi-faceted character of the *parakratos*, considering it from the viewpoint of changing historical and political realities and the metamorphosis of its interpretation.

I was inspired by conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), as formulated by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck. In his work, Koselleck focuses on the use of value-laden concepts as political tools: “concepts whose semantic ‘carrying capacity’ extends further than the ‘mere’ words employed in the sociopolitical domain.”¹⁶ I argue that the *parakratos* is one such concept because in Greece it historically has played an essential role in political campaigns for mobilizing voters and legitimating political leaders. Koselleck emphasizes “the autonomous power of words, without whose use human actions and passions could hardly be experienced, and certainly not made intelligible to others.” Furthermore, he notes that concepts have both the ability to change society and, at the same time, to transform themselves as society evolves.¹⁷ In this understanding, the *parakratos* was not only a characteristic feature of the post-civil war political regime, but as a concept it has also influenced the optics through which that regime, and later ones, have been studied, analyzed, and categorized. It is a term we must understand better in order to enhance our overall understanding of the post-civil war period.

Like the concepts Koselleck writes about, the term *parakratos* has lived a life of its own, gradually changing its meaning as the political and historical context changed around it. The term was originally exploited by the Left and the Center, whose representatives challenged the legality

16 Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times* (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1985), 76.

17 Ibid., 82–83. See also Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

and legitimacy of right-wing rule and demanded that the regime respect democracy. Soon enough, the term became a tool for mobilizing voters, a shorthand for accusing political adversaries (regardless of their political orientation) of secretly acting to direct political developments in Greece. I argue that political actors use the term *parakratos* to demonize each other and to emphasize their victimhood. The conspiratorial nature of the concept continues to play a fundamental role in analysis of the parallel system of political power and the post-civil war political regime as such. Thus, when we refer to the *parakratos*, we need to acknowledge that the term emerged in the post-civil war period and was an intrinsic part of the political discourse of that time. It developed within the confines of a restricted political and legal regime and was embedded in the Cold War setting, which in Greece was characterized by intense anti-communist propaganda and an atmosphere of mutual mistrust. The continued use of the term *parakratos* strengthened Right–Left antagonism and broadened the rift in Greek society.

The ongoing application of the term *parakratos* to contemporary Greece is also problematic. Despite some deficiencies, Greece undoubtedly is a democratic state. Yet, the concept of *parakratos* presumes the involvement of the authorities and political representatives of the state (*kratos*) in its operation.¹⁸ The *parakratos* has been described by scholars as a semi-independent entity that defined its role not only with regard to what the state wanted but mainly according to its own particular interests.¹⁹ The functioning of the *parakratos* relied heavily on networks of clientelism, patronage, and the related distribution of power, which constituted a typical feature in modern Greek society. The *parakratos* manifested itself in the abuse of power and exceeding of constitutional and legal authority.²⁰ Thus, the presumption that the *parakratos* still exists

18 For example, Nikos P. Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos, “Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece,” September 2002, 3–4, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203311462>.

19 Cf. Giannis Gianouloupoulos, “To elliniko parakratos kai i makra istoria tou, to foititiko kinima ton archon tis dekaetias tou 1960: I dolofonia tou Grigori Lambraki [The Greek Parakratos and its Long History, the Student Movement of the Early 1960s: The Assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis],” in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syziti 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleftismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 140.

20 Stratos Dordanas, “‘I organosi tis karfitsas’: Kratos kai parakratos sti Thessaloniki ti dekaetia tou 1960 [‘The Pin Organization’: The State and the Parastate in Thessaloniki in the 1960s],” in *‘I syntomi dekaetia tou ’60: Thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The “Short” 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 126–42. On clientelism, see Sotiris Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton*

today in Greece tends to undermine trust in the current Greek political system. For these reasons and given the ideologically loaded and conspiratorial nature of the term, I do not consider it a reliable academic concept. I would also refrain from applying it to analysis of historical and political situations other than of post-civil war Greece.

In terms of sources and methodology, my research is predominantly based on historiographic analysis. Therefore, my primary sources consisted of a wide range of literature written mostly in Greek, English, and German. These works, mainly related to the civil war and post-civil war periods in Greece, usually speak of the phenomenon of the *parakratos* in broad terms. While they represent a great source to study various interpretations of the phenomenon, they appear less reliable as for the reconstruction of the historical reality. Yet, with many archives remaining classified, the literature continues to be irreplaceable. Secondly, I used archival materials, such as statutes and other administrative documents related to the operations of *parastate* organizations, which I gathered from archives in Greece, specifically from the Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI), General State Archives (GAK) and the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive Society (ELIA) in Athens, and the Historical Archive of Macedonia (IAM) in Thessaloniki. For an external view of post-civil war Greek domestic developments, I researched archival material of the British diplomatic mission in Greece in the National Archives (NA) in London. The United Kingdom naturally sided with the anti-communist regime in Athens. Yet, being less involved in the policymaking than the US representatives in Greece, the British diplomats located in Athens and Thessaloniki often made great observers, providing critical reports of the political situation. Furthermore, I used legislative acts, included in the *Official Gazette of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece* (FEK) and the *Official Journal of the European Communities* (EUR-Lex). I also cited international treaties available in the US Library of Congress (LoC) and records of parliamentary debates in the Hellenic Parliament Minutes (Praktika Voulis). Besides those sources, I drew from press accounts published in newspapers that espoused views on various manifestations of the *parakratos* in Greek history, ranging from left wing to right wing. Historically, newspapers served as the

Emfylio Polemo: Koinovouleftismos kai diktatoria [Greek Politics after the Civil War: Parliamentarism and Dictatorship] (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 38; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 21.

main communication platform for political parties in Greece.²¹ I further relied on electronic media for reports of contemporary debates about the *parakratos* and the *deep state*.

I opened my research with an overview of international academic debates over the existence and functioning of various power structures that have acted in parallel to official authorities. I first attempt to compare the concept of the *parakratos* with similar concepts that have appeared in the social sciences literature, such as *parapolitics* and the *parastate*, the *parallel state*, the *state within a state*, the *dual state*, the *security state*, and the *deep state*. For that purpose, I mainly rely on two authors: Ola Tunander, who introduced the theory of the *security state*²² and Mehtap Söyler, who analyzed the Turkish *deep state*.²³ Furthermore, I discuss the *parakratos* with respect to the ongoing debate about whether or not the *deep state* is a conspiracy theory.²⁴ Second, I contextualize the *parakratos* by comparing it with the similarly controversial concept of parallel security mechanisms, focusing on Cold War Greece, Italy, and Turkey as geographically and politically close case studies. The so-called NATO stay-behind armies in Europe, still evading a thorough scrutiny by researchers given the classified status of most archival documents, became subject of a great number of works, including by Greek authors.²⁵ While they highlighted the commonalities between the stay-behind armies in individual NATO states in Europe, the Greek domestic understanding of the *parakratos* tends to see the phenomenon as unique to Greece and not the same as, for instance,

21 For a discussion on the post-civil war media landscape, see Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos* [A War Without the End], 35.

22 Ola Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West," in *Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 56–72.

23 Mehtap Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 73 (London; New York: Routledge, 2015).

24 Cf. Nebojša Blanuša, "The Deep State between the (Un)Warranted Conspiracy Theory and Structural Element of Political Regimes?," *Critique and Humanism* 49, no. 1 (2018): 369–84; Türkay Salim Nefes, "The Conspiratorial Style in Turkish Politics: Discussing the Deep State in the Parliament," in *Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them*, ed. Joseph E. Uscinski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 385–94; Doğan Gürpınar, "Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory," in *Conspiracy Theories in Turkey* (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), 61–73.

25 For instance, Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Leopoldo Nuti and Olav Riste, "Introduction – Strategy of Stay-Behind," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (2007): 929–35. As for Greek authors, Alexis Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias: O amerikanikos paragon 1947–1967* [The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947–1967] (Athens: Estia, 2002); Bournazos, "To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally Minded]."

Turkey's *deep state*.²⁶ I would argue that the concepts of *parakratos* and the stay-behind armies were two sides of the same anti-communist coin, one directed at the protection from the presumed internal enemy and one against the external threat of the USSR.²⁷

The term *parakratos* has mainly been employed by left-wing historians, who intended it to mean the tool of the unofficial anti-communist campaigns instigated by the post-civil war state, in parallel with open, official legal persecution. Therefore, in the second chapter, I investigate another term common in left-wing political speech—"the para-constitution" (*parasyntagma*). The "para-constitution" encompasses a set of emergency laws that were enacted during the civil war to counter communist sympathizers, which continued to be used in the post-civil war period despite their unconstitutionality. While historians tend to see the *parakratos* as a power system parallel to the official state, they generally understand the "para-constitution" as a parallel legal system that delimited the space within which the *parakratos* operated. By putting the anti-communism of the post-civil war Greek state into a wider historical perspective, I emphasize its continuity with previous periods dating back to the Balkan Wars. The tutelage of the United States in the Cold War added a further twist to Greece's anti-communist policies. However, the United States did not influence a radical deviation from the political course that had already been set by the time it became involved in Greece. A better understanding of the government's anti-communist policies, as well as the way it justified and used them in domestic politics, is needed to properly contextualize the *parakratos*. In fact, the *parakratos* gained strength after the abolishment of the "para-constitution" under pressure from the European Economic Community (EEC), with which Greece concluded its association agreement in September 1961.

In left-wing historiography, the post-civil war *parakratos* was a product of a political regime that was authoritarian by nature. Moreover, leftist scholars referred to the "right-wing establishment" (*dexio katestimeno*) or the "right-wing state/state of the Right" (*dexio kratos/kratos tis dexias*) to emphasize the unchallengeable dominance of the Right, especially in the first years after the civil war. In the third chapter, I investigate whether the political regime of that time was democratic or authoritarian, a matter about which scholars differ. The character of the regime played

26 See Gianouloupoulos, "To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]," 139–78.

27 Papachelas, *O viasmós tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 25–26.

a significant role in the relationship between the state and the *parakratos*. Relying on the definition of authoritarian regimes by Juan Linz, I question whether the existence of parallel power structures in a state necessarily negates its democratic character. I also question whether an authoritarian regime actually needs a parallel power structure.

In the fourth chapter, I scrutinize the *parakratos* as it appears in historiography of Greece. I focus on its presumed roots and actors, its relationship to the state, and its reason for being. Historians disagree about when, how, and why the *parakratos* developed. There is also no consensus about the actors who were its members, whose interests it represented, and the aims it pursued. I outline three major conceptions of the *parakratos*—a paramilitary, a military, and a conspiratorial type. Furthermore, I show that the idea of a conspiratorial *parakratos* was inspired by the post-civil war anti-Right rhetoric of the Left and the Center.

The *paramilitary parakratos* was based in the activities of rural armed bands and urban *parastate* organizations composed of ultra-nationalist citizens. The history of paramilitaries in Greece has been researched by numerous authors, who have concentrated on various eras in Greek history. In my research, I reviewed works that attempted to trace the roots of the post-civil war *parakratos* back to previous periods. Spyros Tsoutsoumpis reached as far back as the Balkan Wars to explain the relevance of paramilitarism and what he calls the *deep state* to the process of building the Greek nation.²⁸ Other authors, among them Georgios Mavrogordatos, Despoina Papadimitriou, Stratos Dordanas, Dimitris Kousouris, Nikos Marantzidis, Vaios Kalogrias, and (among non-Greek authors) David H. Close, analyzed the role of paramilitaries in the First World War, interwar, Second World War, and civil war periods.²⁹ As

28 Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits,” 37–64.

29 George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Ethnikos dichasmos kai maziki organosi. Oi Epistratoi tou 1916* [*National Schism and Mass Organization. The 1916 Reservists*] (Athens: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 1996); Despina Papadimitriou, “Oi Epistratoi sta chronia tou protou poleμου. Politiki via kai ‘akro-dexies symperifores’ [Epistratoi During the First World War. Political Violence and ‘Far-Right Behaviours’],” *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 13–22; Stratos Dordanas, “Parakratikes organoseis kai akro-dexia: Apo ton A’ Pagkosmio Polemo stin Ellada tis krisis [Parastate Organizations and the Far-Right: From the First World War until Greece in Crisis],” *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 31–46; Dimitris Kousouris, “O fasismos stin Ellada: Synecheies kai asynecheies kata ton evropaiiko 20. aiona [Fascism in Greece: Continuities and Discontinuities during the European Twentieth Century],” in *Tō ‘vathy kratos’ sti simerini Ellada kai i Akro-dexia: Astynomia, dikaosyni, stratos, ekklesia* [*The “Deep State” in Today’s Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church*], ed. Dimitris Christopoulos (Athens: Nisos, 2014), 33–81; Nikos Marantzidis, “Ethnotikes diastaseis tou Emfyliou Poleμου: I periptosi ton tourkofonon pontion kapetanaion tis Makedonias [The Ethnic Dimensions of the Civil War: The Case of the Turkish Speaking Captains of

for post-civil war Greece, *parastate* organizations have usually been discussed with reference to their members' collaboration during the Second World War and their far-right political tendencies. Already in the 1960s, Andreas Lendakis scrutinized this issue,³⁰ later followed by Stratos Dordanas, Dimitris Psarras, and Tasos Kostopoulos.³¹

The *military parakratos* represents an axis of research in which scholars have focused on politicization, autonomization, and conspiracies in the Greek army. The post-civil war role of the army in Greek politics was outstandingly well elaborated in both joint and individual publications by Thanos Veremis and André Gerolymatos,³² and in a well-researched book by Dimitrios Papadiamantis.³³ I also made great use of older works on clandestine military organizations written by Georgios Zaharopoulos, Nikolaos Stavrou, and Dimitrios Paralikas.³⁴ The works of Antonis

Macedonia],” in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Februarios 1945–Augoustos 1949)* [*The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945–August 1949)*], ed. Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas (Athens: Themelio, 2002), 208–21; Vaios Kalogrias, “Enoples omades anexartiton oplarchigon kai ethnikiston axiomatikton stin periochi metaxy Strymona kai Axiou (1941–1944)” [The Armed Groups of Independent Chieftains and Nationalist Officers in the Area between the Strymonas and the Axios Rivers (1941–1944)], in *Oi alloi Kapetanioi: Antikommounistes enoploi sta chronia tis Katochis kai tou Emfyliou* [*The Other Captains: Anti-Communist Gunmen During the Occupation and the Civil War*], ed. Nikos Marantzidis (Athens: Estia, 2005), 127–200; David H. Close, “The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State,” in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 156–89.

- 30 Andreas Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia* [Youth Neofascist Organizations] (Athens: Ekdosi D.K.N. Grigoris Lambrakis, 1963).
- 31 Dordanas, “I organosi tis karfitsas” [“The Pin Organization”]; Stratos Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti naftalini: Epivioseis tou dosilogismou sti Makedonia, 1945–1974* [*The German Uniform in Mothballs: The Survival of Collaborationism in Macedonia, 1945–1974*] (Athens: Estia, 2012); Dordanas, “Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organizations and the Far-Right]”; Psarras, “O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the August 4 Party]”; Kostopoulos, “O nazismos os egcheirima antiexgergis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]”. The topic was also elaborated on by the unpublished MA thesis, written by the student of Stratos Dordanas: Athanasios D. Gkanoulis, “Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos sti metapolemiki Ellada, 1949–1967 [Far-Right Organizations and the Para-State in Post-War Greece, 1949–1967]” (MA Thesis, Thessaloniki, University of Macedonia, 2016).
- 32 Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997); Thanos Veremis and André Gerolymatos, “The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940–1949,” *Journal of Hellenic Dispora* 17, no. 1 (1991): 103–28; André Gerolymatos, “The Road to Authoritarianism: The Greek Army in Politics, 1935–1949,” *Journal of Hellenic Dispora* 35, no. 1 (2009): 7–26.
- 33 Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949–1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949–1967)*].
- 34 George Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece,” in *Greece under Military Rule*, ed. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972); Nikolaos A. Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions: The Political Role of the Greek Military* (Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 1976); Dimitrios K. Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944–1974* [*Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944–1974*] (Athens: Vaskedis, 1982).

Kakaras on the officer corps of the Greek army and Panos Krikis on the long-term status of the army in the Greek state were other resources. Military conspiracies have been addressed by numerous authors researching the domestic and international aspects of the post-civil war era. Books by Sotiris Rizas, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Alexis Papachelas were particularly useful for providing necessary context.³⁵

Approaching the *parakratos* as a military or paramilitary phenomenon is common in the historiography of Greece, but I wanted to advance the discussion with a perspective that understands the *parakratos* as a broader conspiracy involving more elements of the Greek state and society. The discourse of conspiracy in the literature about the *parakratos* has been influenced by the political speech of the Left and the Center in the 1960s, a crucial decade for the formation of the left-wing historiography. The understanding of the *parakratos* as a conspiracy is characteristic of an older generation of authors who were often affiliated with left-wing and centrist political parties and organizations.³⁶ One exception is Evi Gkotzaridis, a historian who belongs to a younger generation of authors. Her discourse demonstrates that left-wing political attitudes persist in the scholarly interpretation of the *parakratos* to this day.³⁷

The central event that shaped today's understanding of the *parakratos* was the assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis, an international peace movement activist and a parliamentary deputy affiliated with the

35 Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfyllo Polemo* [Greek Politics after the Civil War]; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*; Ilias Nikolakopoulos, *I kacheptiki dimokratia: Kommata kai ekloges, 1946–1967* [Cacheptic Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946–1967], 1. ekd, Neoteri kai synchroni istoria 4 (Athens: Patakis, 2014); Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias* [The Rape of Greek Democracy].

36 Potis Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou. Ta dramatika gegonota 1961–1967* [Georgios Papandreou. The Dramatical Events 1961–1967] (Athens: Fytrakis/Typos A.E., 1988); Tasos Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas: apo ta prota metemthlyiopolemika chronia os tin imera tou stratiotikou praxikopimatos ton syntagmatarchon* [History of Contemporary Greece: From the First Post-Civil War Years to the Day of the Military Coup of the Colonels] (Athens: Ekdoseis Patakis, 1998); Makis Mailis, *To astiko politiko systima stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967* [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2014); Babis Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada* [The Parastate in Greece] (Athens: Skaravaiois, 1975); Giannis P. Tzannetaktos, “Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Parastate, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s],” in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzytisi 50 chronia meta* [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After], ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleftismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 127–38; Gianouloupoulos, “To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos].”

37 Evi Gkotzaridis, “Who Really Rules This Country?” Collusion between State and Deep State in Post–Civil War Greece and the Murder of Independent MP Grigoris Lambrakis, 1958–1963,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28, no. 4 (2017): 646–73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1386458>.

left-wing EDA. He was killed in Thessaloniki in May 1963. Lambrakis's murder has commonly been blamed by left-wing politicians, media, and subsequently by scholars on members of the *parastate*. The investigation of his death brought to light much of what is now known about the operation of *parastate* groups and the complicity of judicial and security authorities, and local political representatives. I benefited from several scholarly works on the Lambrakis case. First and foremost were recent books by Evi Gkotsaridis³⁸ and Christos Chalazias (co-authored with Grigoris Lambrakis, the son of the assassinated deputy)³⁹ and an older anthology of documents with a commentary by Pavlos Petridis.⁴⁰ On the fiftieth anniversary of Lambrakis's death, a volume with a dozen co-authors (among them Stratos Dordanas, Giannis Gianouloupoulos, Giannis Tzannetakos, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Sotiris Rizas, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Ioanna Papathanasiou, Giorgos Romaïos, and Leonidas Kallivretakis), all of whom I cite in my book, gave general consideration to the historical importance of the Lambrakis assassination as it relates to political developments and the concept of the *parakratos*.⁴¹

In the fifth and the sixth chapters, I dedicate attention to conspiratorial military groups and civilian *parastate* organizations. Both phenomena were debated intensively in post-civil war Greece, conducted in the Cold War atmosphere of distrust. I argue that the reality of the *parakratos* was in many ways much less sophisticated than its political reputation suggests. Greek society has traditionally relied on clientelism and patronage based on political loyalties. One's personal political orientation had direct impact on one's social status and opportunities for professional development, especially in the state administration, the army, and the security forces.⁴² In post-civil war Greece, political allegiances were crucial. Both "genuine" and "presumed" communists became

38 Evi Gkotsaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the Long Shadow of Civil War* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

39 Christos I. Chalazias and Grigoris Gr. Lambrakis, *I dolofonia tou Lambraki kai to parakratos* [*The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos*] (Athens: Papazisis, 2019).

40 Pavlos V. Petridis, *Dolofonia Lambraki: Anekdoti dokoumenda, 1963–1966* [*The Assassination of Lambrakis: Unpublished Documents, 1963–1966*], ed. Angelos Sideratos (Chalandri: Proskinio, 1995).

41 Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, eds., *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitiisi 50 chronia meta* [*The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After*] (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleftismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016).

42 Cf. Despina Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon: I syntiritiki skepsi stin Ellada, 1922–1967* [*From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded: Conservative Thought in Greece, 1922–1967*] (Athens: Savvalas, 2006).

subject to political and economic exclusion, surveillance and control by the security services, and legal persecution. Anti-communists received professional, economic, and social benefits.⁴³ From that perspective, instead of being a shadow government and directing political developments, the structures of the *parakratos* served as a vehicle for the social and professional reintegration of Greek citizens who found themselves, for various reasons, at the margins of society. Be they former Nazi collaborators, far-right extremists, criminals, or simply socially disadvantaged, economically precarious citizens, the members of the *parakratos* fostered political connections in order to improve their social status. The *military parakratos* in particular was an interest group that aimed at advancing its members' personal interests, professional standing, and access to political power. The rank and file of the *parastate* structures were, however, exploited by the political, military, and security leaderships, who abused the *parakratos* while pursuing their own interests and will to power.

43 Minas Samatas, "Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 13, no. 3–4 (1986): 5–75; Polymeris Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002); Stergiou, "Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]"; Bournazos, "To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally Minded]"; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*.

1. The *Parakratos*: The Definition of the Term and Its Positioning in the Scientific Debate

The term *parakratos*, powerful and inciting as it is, has made a significant imprint on modern Greek history as well as on political speech in Greece. Despite its indisputable historical significance and continuous use in public discourse, the term has so far evaded a detailed scholarly analysis. As a point of departure, the Georgios Babiniotis Dictionary of Modern Greek, a popular reference source in Greece, can offer us a basic definition of *parakratos* as a “power mechanism of a politico-military character with strong interconnections and access to the mechanisms of the official state power, parallel to which it develops arbitrary, secret and illegal actions.”⁴⁴ Additionally, as the dictionary states, these actions can be either complementary with regard to state power, leading primarily to the repression of political dissidents and opposition parties, or can prevent the implementation of official policy, especially in the case of unstable and newly established democratic regimes. Furthermore, it directly refers to post-civil war Greece (1949–1967) and the phenomenon of political murders of leftist opponents of the regime. Along with this, the dictionary also provides the definition for a member of the *parakratos* (a so-called *parakratikos*), who is described as “every person who participates in the *parakratos* or serves its purposes.”⁴⁵

In the scholarly literature, the term *parakratos* usually relates to the period of the post-civil war right-wing conservative regime in Greece, which was characterized by strongly anti-communist policies and the

⁴⁴ Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas* [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language], 1328.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

suppression of the leftist political opposition. The term became especially prominent in the leftist and centrist discourse throughout the 1960s and onwards, appearing both in political speech and media.⁴⁶ At the same time, it earned the attention of foreign actors and can be found, for example, in materials of the British Embassy in Athens and the Foreign Office (as *para-state*).⁴⁷ It constituted an attempt to accuse multiple actors, mainly the Right, the Royal Palace, the army, the security forces, and foreign powers, such as the US, of complicity in pursuing non-democratic practices and of violations of human and political rights in the country. Moreover, particularly following the introduction of the junta (1967–1974), the term served as an explanation for alleged informal, clandestine alliances between the leadership of the Greek armed forces, foreign intelligence services, and various political and economic interest groups.⁴⁸ As such, the term strived to embrace a number of historical phenomena with a similar, though not entirely identical, political background. Moreover, *parakratos* evolved as a highly ideologically loaded term that in itself condensely conveyed the tense post-civil war political setting as well as the escalated atmosphere of the Cold War era, all of which can be attributed to its derogatory character.⁴⁹

From the epistemological perspective, the use of the term *parakratos* in scholarly works is therefore rather problematic, despite the fact that the expression even found its place in historiography outside of Greece.⁵⁰ Besides being politically biased and created to serve political purposes, the concept has a clearly conspiratorial character that may—without the provision of solid historical evidence—degrade into a mere conspiracy

46 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “To stavrodromi tou 1963 [The Crossroads of 1963],” in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syziti 50 chronia meta* [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After], ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovoulftismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 227–28; Gkotzaridis, “Who Really Rules This Country?,” 647.

47 NA FO 371/169055 (May 25, 1963); NA FO 371/180008 (January 5, 1964); NA FCO 9/117 (January 4, 1967).

48 For example, see Gianouloupoulos, “To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos],” 139–42.

49 Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits,” 39–40.

50 Cf. Heinz Richter, “The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War,” in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides, Modern Greek Studies Association Series 4 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981); Hagen Fleischer, “Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage,” in *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century*, ed. J. W. Borejsza, K. Ziemer (New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2006); Pavel Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka* [The History of Greece] (Prague: NLN, 2009), 458, 463, 505; Alexander Strassner, *Militärdiktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert: Motivation, Herrschaftstechnik und Modernisierung im Vergleich* [The Twentieth Century Military Dictatorships: Motivation, Governance Techniques and Modernization Compared] (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), 142.

theory. Moreover, reliable literature on the topic is relatively scarce, access to relevant archival material limited, and a generally recognized definition of the phenomenon absent. On top of that, the term continues to be used in contemporary Greek public and political discourse as well to describe rather less analogical political situations without respecting the historical context in which the term emerged. As a consequence, its original meaning has significantly changed over time; one could argue that the term nowadays suffers from the symptoms of “concept stretching,” as described by Giovanni Sartori.⁵¹ Nevertheless, even today, it bears some very negative implications and serves as a condemnation or accusation of those against whom it is employed, regardless of their actual political orientation.

In this chapter, I am going to focus on the notion of *parapolitics* and will introduce concepts similar to *parakratos*, namely the *parastate*, the *dual state*, and the *deep state* (which is sometimes referred to as a *security state*, a *shadow state* or a *state within a state*). Furthermore, I will elaborate on the matter of NATO’s stay-behind armies (meaning the clandestine alliances between NATO command and the US and UK intelligence services as well as their covert military operations in Cold War Europe) as these have often been perceived as being interconnected with the activities of the *deep state*. In general, the issue appears to be fundamental to the understanding of the Cold War context of these parallel power structures. In this way, I will attempt to place the term *parakratos* in a broader socio-scientific debate and show how it overlaps with these concepts.

Moreover, besides Greece, special attention will be paid to the cases of Italy and Turkey since these can help contextualize the case of Greece, especially because the existing literature on *parakratos* is still relatively scarce and the concept, as such, is minimally developed theoretically. All three countries were specific for their geographical and strategic position at the border between the capitalist West and the communist Eastern Bloc. With Turkey and, to some extent, Italy, Greece shares the common historical experience of military interventions in its political life. Another important aspect was the strong post-war political position of the Left in Italy and in Greece, as well as the extensive attempts at its suppression by the ruling regimes and their international allies. With Turkey, Greece

51 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53.

had in common the traditionally strong presence of paramilitarism (or banditry), which oftentimes substituted the state's political, economic, and security role in remote areas, isolated from the power of the central authorities. Thus, this chapter attempts to provide a general framework for the analysis of *parakratos* by setting it within the proper historical, political, and cultural context.

1.1 The Parastate and the Debate on Parapolitics

Etymologically, the term *parakratos* likely emerged as a loan translation of the English term *parastate*.⁵² Indeed, some studies were employing these terms synonymically; nevertheless, as we will see, the *parastate* can be considered a rather unsatisfactory and unreliable substitute.⁵³ According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *parastate* (adj. *parastatal*) is either “[a]n institution or body which takes on some of the roles of civil government or political authority” or “an agency through which the state works indirectly.”⁵⁴ Unfortunately, this definition is too vague to give us an idea of the origin, structure, and aims of such a parastatal entity. Secondly, it enables a parallel coexistence of opposing interpretations of what the role of the state is with regard to the *parastate*. In other words, the state can—but does not necessarily have to—assume the position of the originator of *parastatal* activities. In reality, the term is used to describe rather less similar phenomena rooted in different historical, political, and cultural contexts. Thus, we can encounter *parastate* in the academic literature on situations as diverse as the modes of operation and functions of the Sicilian mafia,⁵⁵ the civil war, paramilitarism and drug trafficking in Colombia,⁵⁶ or post-colonialist forms of government in Black Africa,

52 Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas* [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language], 1328.

53 For a critique see e.g. Gianouloupoulos, “To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos],” 166.

54 *The Oxford English Dictionary*, XI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 209.

55 Henner Hess, “The Sicilian Mafia: Parastate and Adventure Capitalism,” in *Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 153–72.

56 Lesley Gill, “Durable Disorder: Parapolitics in Barrancabermeja,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 42, no. 4 (2009): 20–24; Lesley Gill, “The Parastate in Colombia: Political Violence and the Restructuring of Barrancabermeja,” *Anthropologica* 51, no. 2 (2009): 313–25; Fernando Estrada G., “The Logic of the Violence in the Civil War: The Armed Conflict in Colombia,” *Perfil de Coyuntura Económica*, no. 17 (2011): 165–94; Isaac Morales Pérez, “Córdoba: paraestado, clientelismo y agentes de la violencia [Córdoba: Parastate, Clientelism and the Agents of Violence],” in *Trans-pasando Fronteras*, 6 (Cali: Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios, Jurídicos,

where non-state power centers take over a part of the state's sovereign rights.⁵⁷ Moreover, some authors used the term to characterize the situation of various separatist quasi-states, or more precisely, internationally unrecognized states that emerged within non-functioning states or states under threat, such as the case of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or even the Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.⁵⁸ However, none of these meanings can be used to outline the Greek *parakratos*.

Closer to the Greek understanding of *parakratos*, notably when providing an example from Greece, brings us to the approach towards *parastate* by Robert Cribb. He defines the term as “a range of institutions which do not, at first glance, resemble states but which nonetheless possess some of the important characteristics of states.”⁵⁹ Typologically, among others, Cribb refers to various covert entities “which seek to control or manipulate state violence independently from within,” such as semi-autonomous intelligence agencies or elite power groups. Specifically, he mentions the case of the Greek Central Intelligence Service (Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion, KYP).⁶⁰ Indeed, during the Cold War era, the KYP

Sociales y Humanistas (CIES), Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias sociales, Universidad Icesi, 2014), 37–54.

57 Trutz von Trotha, “Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit [The Future Lies in Africa: On the Disintegration of States, the Dominance of Concentric Order and the Rise of Para-Statehood],” *Leviathan*, no. 28 (2000): 253–79; Trutz von Trotha and Georg Klute, “Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit – das Beispiel Schwarzafrika [From the Post-Colony to the Para-Statehood – The Example of Black Africa],” in *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001* (Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, 2001).

58 For a detailed analysis see the Special Issue of *Nationalities Papers* on the “Emergence and Resilience of Parastates,” including Michael Rossi and Jaume Castan Pinos, “Introduction to Inconvenient Realities: The Emergence and Resilience of Parastates,” *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 1 (January 2020): 12–23. Also cf. P.H. Liotta, “Balkan Fragmentation and the Rise of the Parastate,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 61–81; Eva von Gerharz, “Zwischen Krieg und Frieden – Die Tamil Tigers und ihre Diaspora als Konfliktpartei und Entwicklungsakteur [Between the War and Peace – The Tamil Tigers and their Diaspora as a Conflict Party and a Development Actor],” *Sociologus* 59, no. 1 (2009): 33–49; Rafał Czachor, “Elity polityczne Osetii Południowej wobec idei niepodległości [Political Elites of South Ossetia towards the Idea of Independence],” *Nowa Polityka Wschodnia* 6, no. 1 (2014): 52–66; Zofia Studzińska, “How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and European Security System,” *Connections* 14, no. 4 (2015): 21–42; Vjeran Pavlaković, “Simboli i kultura sjećanja u Republici Srpskoj Krajini [Symbols and Culture of Remembrance in the Republika Srpska Krajina],” *Politička Misao / Croatian Political Science Review* 53, no. 3 (2016): 26–49.

59 Robert Cribb, “Introduction: Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal Sovereignty,” in *Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 4.

60 Ibid.

evolved in close cooperation with the CIA into a powerful and, to a great extent, politically unaccountable actor with a far-reaching impact on domestic political life in Greece. Moreover, the KYP has been perceived by many historians as an inseparable element in the wider picture of the *parakratos*, or even its main instigator.⁶¹ The problem is that the general understanding of who acts within the *parakratos* is much wider, as illustrated in detail in chapter 4.

In Cribb's study, the use of the term *parastate* is closely connected to the scholarly debate over *parapolitics*. By *parapolitics*, he means a phenomenon of "a strange, powerful, clandestine and apparently structural relationship between state security-intelligence apparatuses, terrorist organizations, and transnational organized criminal syndicates."⁶² To paraphrase Scott, *parapolitics* can be defined in this way as a political system or practice of covert politics where accountability is consciously diminished and where irresponsible agencies or para-structures, such as intelligence agencies, are politically exploited.⁶³ Scholarly debates over *parapolitics* originated in the early 1990s, sparked by the public revelations concerning the alleged existence of NATO's stay-behind armies in Cold War Europe as well as the interference of the US and UK intelligence services in the domestic politics of Western European states. However, the debate was intellectually rooted in the 1960s and related to the international political practice of the Cold War period. As Cribb explains, until the 1960s, scholars considered the clandestine nature of *parapolitics* as a way to preserve forces that stood in opposition to the state order, such as criminals or rebels. By contrast, from the later scholarly perspective, the clandestine activity started to be seen as being carried out either by state institutions themselves or by institutions linked to the ruling elite. *Parapolitics* has thus aimed to sustain the existing formally democratic regimes, which were, nevertheless, bearing some non-democratic, illiberal features.⁶⁴

61 For example, see Tsoutsoumpis, "Political Bandits", 55; Gianouloupoulos, "To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]", 140–41; David H. Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (London; New York: Longman, 1995), 155.

62 Cribb, "Introduction," 1. See also Eric M. Wilson, ed., *The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex*, International and Comparative Criminal Justice (Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).

63 Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War* (Indianapolis, IN: 1972), 171.

64 Cribb, "Introduction," 1–2, 5–6.

As an example of *parapolitics*, the issue of NATO's stay-behind armies and their intelligence and security operations in Cold War Europe enjoyed great public interest from the 1990s onwards. Having attracted the attention of many conspiracy theorists, the phenomenon also became subject of academic research. Since the 2005 pioneering book by Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, widely criticized for the insufficiency and inconsistent analysis of the used sources,⁶⁵ a number of national case studies emerged putting a greater emphasis on source base and national specificities, rather than drawing generic conclusions. Thus, while Ganser suggested the existence of vast alliances between the US and Western European intelligence services, far-right paramilitaries and criminal gangs, stretching across Europe, with top-level national political representatives being complicit in pursuing US-directed security aims,⁶⁶ for instance, the 2021 study by Francesco Cacciatore on Cold War Italy problematizes this perspective. The author outlined the "nuanced" relationship between the CIA and Italian intelligence, rejecting the typical view of the CIA as "a shady mastermind pulling the strings." Furthermore, he emphasized the dynamics of international cooperation, the coordination within NATO, and the role of local actors as well as disagreements between the US and Western European states.⁶⁷

As another instance of *parapolitics*, several authors investigated the involvement of the CIA in drug-related organized crime and the undermining of democratic processes in third world countries. In his book, Alfred McCoy focused on the cooperation between the CIA and French intelligence services in opium and heroin production and trade in Indochina.⁶⁸ Peter Dale Scott took a similar path when analyzing the interconnections between drug trafficking, the oil industry, intelligence networks, and US interventionism in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina.⁶⁹ More recently, Ryan Gingeras explored the role of orga-

65 For instance, Peer Henrik Hansen, "A Review of: Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* 19, no. 1 (2006): 182–86.

66 Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*.

67 Francesco Cacciatore, "Stay-behind networks and interim flexible strategy: the 'Gladio' case and US covert intervention in Italy in the Cold War," *Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 5 (2021), 642–59.

68 Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973).

69 Scott, *The War Conspiracy*; Peter Dale Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina*, War and Peace Library (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Peter Dale Scott, *The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); Peter Dale Scott, *American War Machine*:

nized crime and opium and heroin production on the development of modern Turkish politics, including the US's involvement, predominantly through the CIA, during the Cold War era.⁷⁰ In the Greek case, the relation between paramilitarism, organized crime, drugs trafficking, and anti-communist intelligence during the civil war was analyzed by Spyros Tsoutsoumpis.⁷¹

In his 2009 analysis, Ola Tunander was able to link the *parapolitics* to the 1955 concept of the *dual state* by Hans Morgenthau.⁷² Unlike Ernst Fraenkel, who modelled the *dual state* on the example of totalitarian Nazi Germany in 1941,⁷³ Morgenthau's approach is particularly valuable for providing a new perspective for the study of democratic regimes with certain non-democratic features. In the example of the US administration, Morgenthau presumed a parallel coexistence of, on the one hand, a state hierarchy that was compliant with the rule of law and endowed by the power of making political decisions and, on the other hand, of a different entity that was more authoritarian by nature and able to exert effective vetoes over these decisions.⁷⁴ Tunander decided to call the latter entity a *security state* (or a *deep state*). He claims that the task of the *democratic state* is to provide legitimacy to security politics, while the *security state* intervenes to place limits on democratic politics when necessary, in line with Carl Schmitt's concept of the *state of emergency*. Thus, Tunander claims, "While the 'democratic state' deals with political alternatives, the 'security state' enters the scene when 'no alternative exists,' when particular activities are 'securitized'—in the event of an 'emergency.' In fact, the security state is the very apparatus that defines when and whether a 'state of emergency' will emerge."⁷⁵ Tunander's approach correlates with the case of post-civil war Greece, which needed to present itself to the outside as a democratic regime, yet certain state entities, termed as *parakratos*, meanwhile assumed the role of a *security state* in order to direct

Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan, War and Peace Library (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

70 Ryan Gingeras, *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

71 Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis, "Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime during the Greek Civil War (1945–1949)," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 43, no. 2 (2019): 262–86.

72 Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State."

73 Ernst Fraenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*. 1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

74 Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics* (Chicago, IL: London: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 400, 405. Morgenthau first published on the matter already in 1955.

75 Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State," 56–57.

Greece's political development or to effectively suspend the democratic state and launch a *state of emergency*, as was executed by the 1967 coup d'état.

Moreover, Tunander argues that, when it comes to actual political practice, the powers of the *security state* (or *deep state*) exceed the mere capacity to veto democratic measures but also include what he calls "fine tuning of democracy." In fact, he attempts to explain why certain otherwise democratic states are occasionally acting outside the law (that is, pursuing *parapolitics*); for example, this could occur by leading a war, supporting terrorism, or instigating violence with the aim of stirring up popular concern over security and the need for increased protection. According to him, the US helped establish *security states* in some Western European countries during the Cold War era, including Greece; these *security states* were then responsible for military coups.⁷⁶ On top of this, it was probably not just concern over internal security but also the institutional weaknesses of these formally democratic states of the Cold War era that created the need to form the informal structures of the *security state* or the *deep state*.⁷⁷ Here again, Greece can stand as an example since not only the presumed internal and external communist threat but also the growing tension within the post-civil war right-wing regime, the decreasing cohesion between its individual guarantors—the Right, the palace, and the army—and the weakening support of the US in the early 1960s led to the expansion of Greece's *security state*.

In her 2015 analysis of the Turkish *deep state*, Söyler criticized the *parapolitics* approaches for failing in "systematically capturing the deep state's characteristics in different polities" varying from consolidated democracies to authoritarian regimes, or even in clearly distinguishing between the *deep state* and another situation when the *deep state* becomes the state itself.⁷⁸ Furthermore, she delved into the issue of the *deep state's* emergence, rise, and possible demise, connecting the *deep state* with the process of state consolidation as well as the specific character of civil–military relations in modern Turkey. Söyler underlines that the validity and function of formal democratic institutions are decisive for differentiating between democracy and autocracy. Similarly, the *deep state* "is defined as a type of formal and informal, or dual, modality of

⁷⁶ Ibid., 57, 66–67.

⁷⁷ Ryan Gingeras, "Last Rites for a 'Pure Bandit': Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish 'Deep State,'" *Past & Present* 206, no. 1 (2010): 155.

⁷⁸ Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1–9.

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